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Much as commercial firms do, terrorist groups use branding to increase support 
and thus their capacity to conduct operations. This thesis introduces the new concept 
“terrorist brand exposure,” as a reflection of effective brand management strategies and 
communications among terrorist groups. In that regard, this thesis seeks to merge two 
vastly different theories, brand theory and terrorism studies, into one package. The 
research involves a quantitative analysis of the terrorist brand exposure of Al Qaeda and 
the Islamic State in the news media published on the Internet between April 1, 2013, and 
December 31, 2015. The results of this thesis validate that terrorist groups can influence 
their brand exposure through violent terrorist actions and manage their brand strategies to 
differentiate themselves from other groups in the global competition for resources.  
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Over the last 15 years, Al Qaeda has been the front-runner in international 
terrorism. However, the rapid growth and expansion in 2013 of Al Qaeda’s former 
franchise and now rival, the Islamic State, has garnered tremendous international media 
attention. This research shows the Islamic State’s brand now far exceeds Al Qaeda’s in 
global media coverage. Many scholars have sought to answer how the Islamic State as a 
franchise has managed to overtake and surpass Al Qaeda’s leading status in the global 
terrorism market.1 This research has developed a new way to quantify the global news 
market’s attention toward terrorist groups by measuring “terrorist brand exposure.” By 
measuring the brand exposure of these two groups, the findings reveal an interesting story 
of the brand strategy of the Islamic State, the struggle to differentiate from Al Qaeda, and 
the reason the group hit critical mass, what terrorism expert Brigitte Nacos terms mass-
mediated terrorism.2  
The use of propaganda by terrorist groups has been widely studied.3 There is a 
vast body of literature on the strategies and capabilities of terrorist groups. These 
organizations market their brands in an effort to generate support in terms of both funding 
and recruits, which ultimately increase their capacity to conduct operations. To do so, 
they need to market their brands in the international arena by gaining media attention 
                                                 
1 Yigal Carmon, Yael Yehoshua and A. Leone, Understanding Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and the 
Phenomenon of the Islamic Caliphate State (Washington, DC: Middle East Media Research Institute: Jihad 
& Terrorism Studies Project,2014). For further discussion of this problem, see Iain Edgar, “The Dreams of 
Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): Elliot Friedland, “Special Report: The Islamic 
State “(The Clarion Project, 2015): “Tobias Feakin and Benedict Wilkinson, The Future of Jihad: What 
Next for ISIL and Al-Qaeda?” (Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute- Strategic Insight, 2015). 
Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al., 
“The War between the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict 
“(Washington, DC: Valens Global, 2015). 
2 Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, 2nd ed. (Latham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 
3 Paul R. Baines and Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy, “Al-Qaeda Messaging Evolution and Positioning, 
1998–2008: Propaganda Analysis Revisited,” Public Relations Inquiry 3, no. 2 (2014) 163–191.For further 
discussion of this problem, see Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy and Paul R. Baines, “Selling Terror: The 
Symbolization and Positioning of Jihad,” Marketing Theory 9, no. 2 (June 01, 2009), 227–241. 
doi:10.1177/1470593109103069.: Anthony Kubiak, “Spelling it Out: Narrative Typologies of Terror,” 
Studies in the Novel 36, no. 3 (Fall, 2004), 294–301. 
2 
through symbolic terrorist attacks, commonly referred to as propaganda of the deed.4 
However, there has been little analysis of terrorist groups from the perspective of brand 
management. The commercial marketplace uses branding to differentiate the products of 
one company from another.5 Scholars apply the term brand loosely and inconsistently 
within the terrorism literature.6 However, few have tried to define terrorist brands in the 
context of how they evolve and what such brands may mean to different potential 
stakeholders.  
This thesis seeks to measure the “chatter,” which this research coins terrorist 
brand exposure in the news media, and submits this new term as a way to assess effective 
brand management strategies and communications among terrorist groups. In that regard, 
this thesis seeks to merge two vastly different theories, brand theory and terrorism 
studies, into one package. The research involves a quantitative analysis of the terrorist 
brand exposure of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in the news media published on the 
Internet between April 1, 2013, and December 31, 2015. This methodology analyzes the 
aggregate number of times each group’s brand name was mentioned, leading to a 
measure of brand exposure in the news media.  
The results of this thesis validate the hypotheses that terrorist groups can 
influence their brand exposure through violent terrorist actions and develop proper brand 
strategies that differentiate themselves in the global competition for resources. The results 
also suggest successful that brand management focuses on credibility and authenticity by 
keeping promises and staying pure to the group’s cause. The Islamic State struggled to 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Acosta, “Live to Win another Day: Why Many Militant Organizations Survive Yet Few 
Succeed,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 2 (2014): 135–161. 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.862900. For further discussion of this problem, see Michael Freeman, “The 
Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 6 (2011): 
461–475. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193.; Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, 
Media, and International Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).; Benedict Wilkinson 
and J. Barclay, “The Language of Jihad: Narrative Responses and Strategies of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula and UK Responses” (London: The Royal United Services Institute, 2011).   
5 Kevin Lane Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand 
Equity, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008). 2 
6 For an example of the loose term of brand applied to terrorist groups, see Paul R. Baines et al., “The 
Dark Side of Political Marketing: Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims,” European 
Journal of Marketing 44, no. 3 (2010): 478–495. doi:10.1108/03090561011020543. 
3 
differentiate itself from Al Qaeda, but the group stayed true to its core tenet of 
establishing an Islamic caliphate and kept its promise by capturing large population 
centers. Fundamentally different from traditional propaganda of the deed, the group’s 
rapid defeat of Iraqi and Syrian forces in open warfare in 2014 brought additional 
credibility and reliability to the brand, which has enticed Muslims who are looking for 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research combines the two fully developed fields of brand theory and 
terrorism studies. In order to explore the intersection of these fields, the following 
background and literature review discusses brand theory, brand exposure, terrorism, and 
terrorist decision-making. In the process, this review also discusses terrorist groups—who 
they are, how they define themselves, how they target, and how brand principles apply to 
them. Then a brief overview of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda brands provides relevance 
to the quantitative evaluation of brand exposure for both groups. 
A. COMMERCIAL BRANDING 
Branding has been around for centuries as there has always been a need to 
differentiate the products of one producer from another.7 Kevin Lane Keller, a leading 
scholar in brand theory, proposes that at the most basic level, branding is attaching a 
label (for identification) and meaning (for understanding) to a product, service, place, or 
organization. He explains, “Brands achieve a certain level of awareness and become 
linked to a set of associations in consumers’ minds.”8 Brands represent the complete 
customer experience and play a role in determining the effectiveness of marketing.9   
The term brand may be applied to many things such as tangible products, 
services, persons, places, or ideas. For consumers, brands simplify choice, reduce 
purchase risk, guarantee a certain level of quality, and build trust.10 Today, we recognize 
the sleek white presentation of the Apple logo and think of high-quality, advanced 
technology devices. We recognize the Harley-Davidson logo and think of black leather 
jackets and free spirited adventure. While pouring a bowl of Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes we 
                                                 
7 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, 2 
8 Kevin Lane Keller, “Branding Perspectives on Social Marketing,” in Association for Consumer 
Research Volume 25, eds. Joseph W. Alba and Hutchinson J. Wesley., Vol. 25 (Provo, UT: Association for 
Consumer Research, 1998), 299–302.           
9 Kevin Lane Keller and Donald R. Lehmann, “Brands and Branding: Research Findings and Future 
Priorities,” Marketing Science 25, no. 6 (2006), 740–759. doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0153. 
10 Ibid. 
6 
think to ourselves the slogan from Tony the Tiger, “They’re grrrrrrreat!” We recognize 
those names, recall their symbolic elements, and remember the products they bring to the 
market, such as the Apple iPhone. Each of these brands brings with it perceived added 
value to the product performance, trust, and reliability.11 
Consumers also recognize people themselves as brands such as Tom Brady, Tiger 
Woods, Cal Ripken Jr., Kim Kardashian, Che Guevara, or Donald Trump. Arguably, 
Osama bin Laden also had a personal brand. To Sunni Muslims, he may have represented 
the pious lifestyle of the crusader defending Islam from impurity. To Westerners, Bin 
Laden’s image is the first when think of terrorism. His name and image were also 
synonymous with the brand name of Al Qaeda, whose members under his authority 
perpetrated the 9/11 attacks in the United States and countless other attacks around the 
world.  
Brand elements often include a brand name, slogan, logo, symbols or pictures, 
characters, spokespeople, packages, and signage.12 In the commercial marketplace, brand 
elements include anything that can be trademarked and protected to prevent the brand 
                                                 
11 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity 
12 For information on brand names and behavioral impacts, and cross cultural implications, see 
Richard R. Klink, “Creating Brand Names with Meaning: The use of Sound Symbolism,” Marketing 
Letters 11, no. 1 (2000): 5–20.: Eric Yorkston and Geeta Menon, “A Sound Idea: Phonetic Effects of Brand 
Names on Consumer Judgments,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. June (2004): 43–51. Shi Zhang 
and Bernd H. Schmitt, “Creating Local Brands in Multilingual International Markets,” Journal of 
Marketing Research 38, no. August (2001): 313–325.  Nader Tavassoli and Jin K. Han, “Auditory and 
Visual Brand Identifiers in Chinese and English,” Journal of International Marketing 10, no. 2 (2002):13–
28. Kevin Lane Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, 
2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 2003). 145.Shi Zhang and Bernard H. Schmitt, 
“Activating Sound and Meaning: The Role of Language Proficiency in Bilingual Consumer 
Environments,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 1 (06, 2004): 220–228. For information on slogans, 
see Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity. 160: 
Academic research rarely explored the impact on consumer behavior of logo design or other visual aspects 
of branding, however see Pamela W. Henderson, Joan L. Geise and Joseph A. Cote, “Impression 
Management using Typeface Design,” Journal of Marketing 68, no. 4 (2004): 60–72. Chris Janiszewski 
and Tom Meyvis, “Effects of Brand Logo Complexity, Repetition, and Spacing on Processing Fluency and 
Judgment,” Journal of Consumer Research 28, no. June (2001): 18–32. For information on packaging, see 
Valerie Folkes and Shashi Matta, “The Effect of Package Shape on Consumers’ Judgments of Product 
Volume: Attention as a Mental Contaminant,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 2 (2004): 390–401. 
Brian Wansink and Koert Van Ittersum, “Bottoms Up! the Influence of Elongation on Pouring and 
Consumption Volume,” Journal of Consumer Research 30, no. 3 (12, 2003): 455–463. Keller, Strategic 
Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity       
7 
from being reproduced by competitors.13 Christopher Pullig suggests that in choosing 
brand elements, a brand must consider “the degree to which they are memorable, 
meaningful, likable, transferable, adaptable, and protectable.”14 The latter two elements 
focus on protecting the brand, making it resilient under market conditions, and preventing 
infringement.15  
There are three traits for evaluating a successful brand: positioning, credibility, 
and authenticity.16 Positioning is the purposeful designing of an organization’s offering 
and image to occupy a distinct place in the mind of a targeted consumer.17 The term 
positioning references time and place in the minds of targeted consumers, so they 
remember the product at the right time to maximize the benefit of the brand. This is done 
by establishing points of parity and points of difference. Points of difference are what 
make the brand unique from the competition or the reason why a consumer should buy its 
product. Points of parity are similarities with competitor brands that negate the points of 
difference, resulting in a consumer with no reason not to purchase the brand. Successful 
positioning clarifies what the brand is about, how it is unique, what similarities are shared 
with the competition, and why consumers should purchase it.18 Positioning provides 
direction for all marketing activities and defines what marketing should and should not 
do.19  
                                                 
13 Ibid., 140. For further discussion of this problem, see Barbara Mueller, Dynamics of International 
Advertising: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2011).   
14 Chris Pullig, “What is Brand Equity and What Does The Branding Concept Mean To You?” 
(Baylor University: Keller Center Research Report, 2008). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Michael B. Beverland, “Crafting Brand Authenticity: The Case of Luxury Wines,” Journal of 
Management Studies 42, no. 5 (07, 2005): 1003–1029. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00530.x. Beverland 
uses differentiation instead of positioning, however positioning is the more developed and comprehensive 
evaluation of a product 
17 Phillip Kotler and Kevin Lane Keller, Marketing Management, 12th ed. ed. (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2006). As referenced in: Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and 
Managing Brand Equity 98 
18 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity,  97–132 
19 Keller and Lehmann, Brands and Branding: Research Findings and Future Priorities, 740–759  
8 
Credibility references the product’s ability to gain the trust and loyalty of the 
target audience and as a result, generate consumer loyalty. Credibility can be enhanced 
by keeping promises made to the consumer. Authenticity, a related concept, is the ability 
to stay true to the core principles of the brand, as well as relevant. One key principle of 
authenticity is executing what the organization or individual says it is going to do.20  
Getting the brand out in the information domain is critical to consumer 
accessibility, in other words, the increased probability your targeted consumer will 
interact with the brand elements. A key element of any successful brand strategy is 
increasing the awareness of the brand in the mind of the consumer. Repeated interactions 
increase the awareness and salience of the brand.21 Therefore, the more consumers are 
exposed to a brand, the greater their ability will be to recall and recognize the brand—and 
the greater the likelihood they will choose that brand over others.22 This research focuses 
on one component of the brand awareness calculation, terrorist brand exposure, which 
will be elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
There has been tremendous research focused on how consumer brand awareness 
affects behavior and future purchasing.23 Brand awareness is the measure of accessibility 
to the brand in the mind. Brand awareness is measured by conducting studies consisting 
of surveys and focus groups to measure two critical sub-attributes, recognition and recall 
                                                 
20 Beverland, Crafting Brand Authenticity: The Case of Luxury Wines, 1003–1029. See also; Jonathan 
Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014): 239-241 
21 David A. Aaker, “Measuring Brand Equity Across Products and Markets,” California Management 
Review 38, no. 3 (Spring, 1996): 102–120. 
22 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity; For 
further discussion of this problem, see  Pullig, “What is Brand Equity and what does the Branding Concept 
Mean to You?”: Leo Bogart and Charles Lehman, “What Makes a Brand Name Familiar?” Journal of 
Marketing Research 10, no. 1 (Feb., 1973): 17–22. Aaker, Measuring Brand Equity Across Products and 
Markets, 102–120. Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, Tanya L. Chartrand and Gavan J. Fitzsimons, “Automatic 
Effects of Brand Exposure on Motivated Behavior: How Apple Makes You “Think Different,” Journal of 
Consumer Research 35, no. 1 (2008): 21–35. 
23 Keller and Lehmann, Brands and Branding: Research Findings and Future Priorities, 740–759. For 
further discussion, see  Fitzsimons, Chartrand and Fitzsimons, Automatic Effects of Brand Exposure on 
Motivated Behavior: How Apple Makes You “Think Different,” 21–35. Lawrence D. Gibson, “Not 
Recall,” Journal of Advertising Research 23, no. 1 (Feb, 1983): 39–46. Larry Percy and John R. Rossiter, 
“A Model of Brand Awareness and Brand Attitude Advertising Strategies,” Psychology and Marketing 9, 
no. 4 (1992): 263–274. doi:10.1002/mar.4220090402. 
9 
(see Figure 1). The aggregate of all responses gives a researcher a proportion of 
consumers who know of the brand. Recall demonstrates the ability of the respondent to 
remember the brand when prompted by a certain category of products, such as cars, or 
fulfillment of a need, such as transportation. Recognition is the ability of the consumer to 
remember specific prior exposure to the brand.24     
The commercial market increases the awareness of the brand by increasing the 
different marketing methods and opportunities for the consumer to interact with the 
brand. A brand accomplishes this by purchasing targeted advertising space in various 
information channels like television or print media based on the results of brand 
awareness studies. Because marketers accomplish this by purchasing available 
advertising space, marketers typically pay little interest in the obvious step that must 
precede recognition and recall, which is brand exposure. To achieve brand awareness, the 
consumer must first be exposed to the brand elements (see Figure 1). To increase brand 
awareness, the marketer must increase the number of times the consumer interacts with 
those brand elements. The quantity of times the brand is available at any given moment is 
called brand exposure.25  The greater the brand is exposed, or available for viewing over 
a period of time, the greater the probability the consumer will see the brand.26 This type 
of exposure goes beyond planned and paid advertisements, extending to those who 
discuss a brand in the media through forums such as newscasts or reviews of a product in 
a magazine.27 
                                                 
24 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity 374–375 
25 Exposure definition: Exposure is defined by the American Marketing Association as “Any 
opportunity for a reader, viewer, or listener to see and/or hear an advertising message in a particular media 
vehicle.” The AMA is the premier and only marketing professionals association, and forms the professional 
community with content from peer reviewed professional and academic journals. American Marketing 
Association (AMA). (updated November 2014) “Exposure: Definition.” 
https://www.ama.org/resources/Pages/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=E :”Exposure: Definition,” ; Keller, 
Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity 
26 American Marketing Association (AMA), Exposure: Definition 
27 Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity 
10 
Figure 1.  Brand Exposure Measurement Precedes the Measurement for Recall and Recognition 
 
 
The author produced these diagrams for clarity by adapting the information provided by Keller, Strategic Brand Management: 
Building, Measuring, and Managing Brand Equity, and David A. Aaker, “Measuring Brand Equity Across Products and Markets,” 
California Management Review 38, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 102–120
11 
Brand exposure is the critical measurement in terrorism branding. Corporate 
marketers pay little attention to exposure because there is no mystery to the numbers. 
They know exactly how much advertising they have purchased, and the results of the 
studies indicate how much more and what types they need to purchase in the future. 
Terrorists do not have the luxury of purchasing advertising and news media coverage. 
They must compel the news media to cover their group by conducting terrorist attacks. 
Until now, there has not been a way to measure how effective terrorist-group operations 
have been at increasing brand exposure. Commercial marketing firms have the financial 
resources to conduct extensive brand awareness studies.  
Studies have shown a link between multiple brand exposures and automatic 
influence on behavior. The brain becomes conditioned to the response when it is exposed 
to certain stimuli such as words, pictures, situations, or a combination thereof. The 
response to the stimuli is stored and activated later when exposed to the same or similar 
stimuli. Marketing, therefore, reinforces the consumer’s previous thoughts about a brand, 
which become stronger with each repeated exposure. Exposure to similar brands may 
connect with the pre-conditioned response, causing the consumer to subconsciously 
connect one brand with another. For instance, if consumers experience positive thoughts 
surrounding the Mercedes Benz brand, they will think positively about Mercedes when 
exposed again to the brand or to similar brands, such as BMW, in the same product and 
quality category.28 Conversely, in the context of terrorism, if potential recruits are 
conditioned to think positively about Al Qaeda, they will respond positively not only to 
Al Qaeda when exposed to the brand but also to other jihadist organizations similar to Al 
Qaeda. There is also a link among conditioning, repeated exposure, and brand choice. 
With the proper conditioning to stimuli, merely being exposed to a brand may be enough 
                                                 
28 Fitzsimons, Chartrand and Fitzsimons, Automatic Effects of Brand Exposure on Motivated 
Behavior: How Apple Makes You “Think Different,” 21–35. William E. Baker, “When can Affective 
Conditioning and Mere Exposure Directly Influence Brand Choice?” Journal of Advertising 28, no. 4 
(Winter, 1999): 31–46. S. Adam Brasel and James Gips, “Red Bull “Gives You Wings” for Better Or 
Worse: A Double-Edged Impact of Brand Exposure on Consumer Performance,” Journal of Consumer 
Psychology 21, no. 1 (1, 2011): 57–64. doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2010.09.008. 
12 
for a consumer to choose the brand at the point of purchase.29 Brand exposure is an 
undervalued portion of brand theory yet plays a critical role in the brand awareness of a 
terrorist group.30 This is an area of study not explored.  
Scholars accept the idea that brand exposure goes beyond an advertising 
campaign mix of television, radio, and Internet advertisements but includes the 
unplanned buzz or chatter generated by the broader public via news and social media.31 
Marketers control brand exposure through paid advertisements and a combination of 
marketing strategies; however, they cannot control the chatter created by the news and 
social media. The news media in this research comprises the professional news agencies 
that also propagate journalistic publications via the Internet. Increasing brand exposure is 
a method for increasing brand awareness and, thus, a brand’s value.32 This thesis limits 
data sources to news stories accessible on the Internet but excludes social media. 
Terrorist brand exposure should include all measures across information platforms, so 
future research should incorporate such methods. 
B. TERRORIST GROUPS AND BRANDING 
Terrorism and terrorist groups have been defined in many ways, and the debate 
continues. The debate centers on the lack of a consensus. This thesis uses the definition 
by renowned terrorism scholar Gordon McCormick, who defines terrorism as the 
“deliberate use of symbolic violence or threat of violence against non-combatants for 
political purposes.”33 Terrorist groups are defined as subnational political organizations 
that employ terrorism.34 It is important to note that many insurgent groups may fit into 
the definition of terrorist groups while fewer terrorist groups fall into the definition of 
                                                 
29 Baker, When can Affective Conditioning and Mere Exposure Directly Influence Brand Choice?, 
31–46. 
30 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. 
31 Keller and Lehmann, Brands and Branding: Research Findings and Future Priorities, 740–759. 
32 Bogart and Lehman, What Makes a Brand Name Familiar?, 17–22. 
33 Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 
(2003):473–507. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085601. 
34 Brian J. Phillips, “What is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical Implications,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 225–242. doi:10.1080/09546553.2013.800048.     
13 
insurgents. However, the distinction between these groups is irrelevant in the context of 
brand exposure. Because insurgent and terrorist groups seek to increase their brand 
exposure, for the purposes of this research, they both fall under the category of terrorist 
groups.  
Terrorist groups commonly utilize mass communications in order to reach 
stakeholders domestically and internationally. These armed groups seek to inform 
stakeholders of who they are, who they are not, what they stand for, and how they are 
different. They seek to communicate the vision and end state of their cause as well as 
how stakeholders may contribute to their operations. From a brand management 
perspective, this is a positioning strategy. They must differentiate themselves from other 
groups that seek similar objectives and use similar narratives while competing for scarce 
resources. Terrorist groups must gain the attention of the world, galvanize support, and 
frame their causes in a manner that resonates broadly.35 Terrorists typically communicate 
three ways: first, the act of violence itself (propaganda of the deed), second, the narrative 
to justify their violence, and third, the messages outlining how the group intends to 
achieve its goals.36  The idea that terrorism is used to communicate and persuade is 
widely accepted.37 It is also widely accepted that terrorists use narratives to elicit support 
and change perceptions.38 They attempt to gain awareness for their groups and causes to 
elicit critical material support required for their success. The greater the exposure and 
brand awareness achieved, the greater likelihood material support will increase.39 
Unfortunately, due to the secretive nature of these groups, there is no accurate measure or 
database of the material resources of terrorist groups, only a wide range of estimations by 
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36 Wilkinson and Barclay, The Language of Jihad: Narrative Responses and Strategies of Al-Qa’ida in 
the Arabian Peninsula and UK Responses : Baines and O’Shaughnessy, Al-Qaeda Messaging Evolution 
and Positioning, 1998–2008: Propaganda Analysis Revisited: 163–191   .                    
37 James McClennon, “Terrorism as Persuasion: Possibilities and Trends,” Sociological Focus 21, no. 
1 (1988): 53–66. B. Richards, “Terrorism and Public Relations,” Public Relations Review 30, no. 2 (2004): 
169–176.  
38 P. R. Neumann, “Joining Al Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe,” Adelphi Paper 48, no. 399 
(2008): 1–71. Mark Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey and John R. Schindler, The Terrorist Perspectives Project : 
Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2008).              
39 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism,  2–8. 
14 
intelligence professionals. Therefore, this research is limited to the measure of brand 
exposure over time. 
Branding is inherently symbolic.40 Terrorism is inherently symbolic.41 However, 
there has been little analysis done on terrorist groups from the perspective of brand 
management.42 Most terrorist groups utilize branding elements, such as brand names, 
logos, symbolism, slogans, characters, spokespeople, or positioning strategies to 
differentiate themselves from competitors. The brand name and logo are the most 
common of these elements.43 The principles of branding appear in the activities of 
terrorist groups, propaganda pamphlets, video watermarks, and jihadi websites.44 This 
research focuses solely on the brand name of a terrorist group as the main brand element 
mentioned during media coverage.  
Insurgent and terrorist groups have carefully selected symbolic icons and logos to 
evoke specific meaning and emotions intended for target audiences. These elements 
represent acts of communication that brand the identity of the group.45 Brand strategies 
are deliberate measures intended to increase the value of the brand for the various 
stakeholders and assist the group in achieving its objectives. At the outset, terrorist 
groups seeking international support use marketing principles to elevate the international 
awareness of their groups and their causes above other groups fighting conflicts around 
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the globe. They enter the global fight for the scarce resources that support terrorist 
activities. Communications that elicit support are directed toward potential state sponsors, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational advocacy (TNA) networks. 
These three types of supporting stakeholders can supply the groups with material 
resources—not to mention valuable international exposure—that are unavailable 
domestically.46  
According to McCormick, the purpose of terrorism is to signal the intentions and 
“determination to use violence to achieve political objectives.”47As McCormick’s 
definition suggests, terrorism is the employment of violent actions for the purposes of 
changing the perception of the audience over particular issues.48 P. Karber has suggested 
a model whereby “as a symbolic act, terrorism can be analyzed much like other media of 
communication, consisting of four basic components: transmitter (the terrorist), intended 
recipient (target), message (bombing, ambush) and feedback (reaction of target 
audience).”49 It is essential for the intended recipient to symbolize the broader target 
audience. When the victim represents the broader audience, then the fear instilled in the 
broader audience generates greater attention for the group. The broader audience who 
visualizes the act must interpret the meaning of its message. The location of the act is 
critical to the correct meaning, so the message becomes more salient than the physical 
damage it inflicts.50  
Terrorism is often a tool used by weaker groups to achieve an objective in 
political bargaining and a critical tool for overcoming inertia. Terrorists must 
communicate their commitment and intentions while also communicating their strength. 
The initial goal of terrorism is to overcome the initial asymmetry of strength and 
information, relative to its opposition. It accomplishes this by striking symbolic targets to 
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place the group on a more equal playing field. The attacks communicate determination, 
strength, and the potential for victory, all of which assist a group in overcoming 
mobilization challenges among potential supporters.51  
The symbolism of the target selected for attack may represent many different 
motivations. A terrorist may choose a victim based on association, in other words, the 
symbolic link to the larger population intended for influence. Oftentimes, citizens are 
considered complicit with the actions of their state. Therefore, the citizens as victims are 
symbolic of the enemy state as a whole. By attacking the citizen, the group symbolically 
sends a message to the population and government of that nation. For example, the 
massacre of the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics by the Palestinian 
terrorist group Black September was an effort to coerce the state of Israel into complying 
with the political objectives of the group.52  
In addition, by measuring brand exposure, this research seeks to submit terrorist 
brand exposure as one element to measure Brigitte Nacos’ theory of mass mediated 
terrorism. Nacos explains, “Terrorists calculate the consequences of their deeds, the 
likelihood of gaining media attention, and most importantly, the likelihood of gaining 
entrance—through the media” to what she calls the triangle of political communication.53 
She further explains that the goals of terrorists include gaining attention and awareness 
for their groups’ causes and motives, the respect and sympathy of those who they claim 
to represent, and the status of legitimate political actors.54  
The target audience must understand the message of the terrorist. Terrorists seek 
to instill an abundance of fear in the target audience, thereby resulting in a substantial 
increase in attention. When fear and attention elevate the group above all others, terrorists 
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achieve mass-mediated terrorism. The goal of mass-mediated terrorism is over-saturation 
of media coverage of a terrorist act. Gabriel Weimann asserts that  
media-wise terrorists plan their actions with the media as a major 
consideration. They select targets, location, and timing according to media 
preferences, trying to satisfy the media criteria for newsworthiness, media 
timetables and deadlines, and media access. They prepare visual aids for 
the media, such as video clips of their actions, taped interviews and 
declarations of the perpetrators, films, press releases, and video news 
releases.55 
Therefore, the intent of terrorist groups is to achieve greater awareness and support, 
reaching the pinnacle at mass-mediated terrorism. Symbolic targets generate greater news 
coverage of the event and indirectly elevate the perpetrator to celebrity status.  
Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City is 
considered the gold standard for mass-mediated terrorism. The World Trade Center was 
chosen as a symbol of Western wealth, global capitalism, power, heritage, and modernity, 
as well as the heart of American culture.56 As a result, the media has been more attuned 
to terrorism and more likely to cover Al Qaeda.57  
Al Qaeda was successful in setting the public agenda for Americans after the 9/11 
attacks as surveys and polls revealed that nearly 100 percent of Americans had followed 
the events in the media. Al Qaeda’s brand became a household name to much of the 
world. The salience of terrorism and the message of Al Qaeda became the primary topic 
of discussion, more so than at any time in the organization’s past. The media investigated 
the organization’s grievances to determine the motive behind the attacks. In an effort to 
bring clarity to their subscribers, the media aired messages from Al Qaeda and covered 
Islamic issues in far greater detail and length than ever before.58 Osama bin Laden was 
elevated to hero status by some Arab news outlets as a result of the attention gained by 
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the attacks. His legitimacy among Muslims across the globe increased as the media talked 
about him more often than many of the world’s most influential leaders.59  
1. The Al Qaeda Brand 
Al-Qaeda, literally translated in English as “the base” or “foundation,” seeks as a 
brand to position itself as the foundation and leader of all Islamic jihadist movements.60 
The original name of the group was “Qa’eda Al-Jihad” but was shortened by the public.61 
The Al Qaeda positioning strategy is to differentiate it from all other Islamic jihadi 
groups as the leader and global Islamic jihad organizer.62 Al Qaeda has always aimed at 
toppling the near enemy of Arab regimes it deemed puppets of the West and those who 
are not true followers of Islam; however, Osama bin Laden’s vision consistently focused 
on the far enemy in the United States and Europe as opposed to direct involvement in 
revolution or civil war.63  
Al-Qaeda’s positioning as the foundation for global jihad established an inherent 
need to franchise the brand name to jihadi groups worldwide.64  Al Qaeda had extended 
its brand name to other organizations in the past, including a united group of Sunni 
insurgents under the banner of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but it later revoked the brand 
name. In a letter to Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden voiced “his concern that 
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attacks that had left Muslims dead … especially in Iraq … had harmed Al Qaeda’s 
image.”65 Bin Laden believed that the persistent negative actions by AQI would devalue 
the Al Qaeda brand.66 Though some scholars debate whether the franchising strategy has 
been successful, empirical evidence suggests the core group of Al Qaeda has experienced 
a net loss.67 In a letter recovered from Bin Laden’s home, the late Al-Qaeda leader 
expressed his concern over the image and brand name of Al Qaeda and pondered 
changing the name to counter what he felt was the brand’s devaluation.68 Bin Laden was 
also frustrated with the shortening of the name, which he thought severed the ties of the 
group to Islamic crusaders, devalued the narrative, and conceded to Western messages 
that intentionally disassociated Islam with the war on terror.69Al Qaeda was in a brand 
crisis that forced its senior leaders to deliberate over a rebranding strategy to reposition 
the group’s image in the minds of the public. 
Al Qaeda has communicated its positioning strategy through a variety of 
techniques. Al Qaeda has leveraged the Internet and mass communications in ways no 
other groups, until the Islamic State, have managed in the past.70 Al Qaeda’s effective use 
of propaganda is a clear means to expand its support base.71 Al Qaeda develops high 
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quality jihadist propaganda in the form of videos that effectively communicate the brand 
through three production organizations: al-Fajr Media Centre, the Global Islamic Media 
Front, and as-Sahab Institute for Media Production.72 
Al Qaeda has a history of indirect involvement in internal conflicts of nations, 
such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, Nigeria—and in Syria through its affiliate, Al 
Nusra.73 However, Al Qaeda has provided indirect support in the forms of resources and 
fighters as opposed to heavy involvement to conquer territory. Al Qaeda seems more 
adept at gaining local allies to ensure safe havens in ungoverned spaces. These locations 
facilitate terrorist training camps and provide fighters with valuable combat experience 
following their training.74 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been more active in the civil war 
in Yemen than any other franchise. Reuters reports that AQAP now governs the port city 
of Mukalla in southeastern Yemen. The group exacts tolls on import ships, which net the 
group millions to support its operations and enrich senior leaders. Figures range from $2 
million to $5 million a day.75   The key difference between the acquisition of the territory 
in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State and land acquisitions in Yemen by AQAP is that 
the territories in Yemen were largely undefended. AQAP seized these areas when the 
opportunity presented itself whereas the Islamic State defeated military units in both Iraq 
and Syria to seize territory.76  
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2. The Islamic State 
While the Islamic State learned its branding strategies from Al-Qaeda, utilizing a 
brand name and logo, it positioned itself as the Islamic caliphate. The Islamic State has 
also expanded territorially by merely extending its brand to splinter groups of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, Libya, and Pakistan.77 The Islamic State has distributed propaganda 
pamphlets with its distinctive logo, which, according to the Times of India, includes the 
“historical stamp of Prophet Muhammad and a Kalashnikov assault rifle.”78 By using 
historic Islamic symbols of Muhamad’s caliphate, it is attempting to place itself in the 
position of the modern caliphate in the minds of Muslims.  
The Islamic State initially began as a confederation of numerous small Sunni 
insurgent groups in Iraq that later merged under one umbrella franchise as Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, the main objective, to expel coalition forces and gain control of Iraq. In total, the 
group has re-branded and changed positioning strategies five times. The former names 
include the Mujahideen Shura Council, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI), the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).79 Each name change signified a need to re-brand the group and communicate a 
strategic shift. However, this research seeks to demonstrate the difficulty the Islamic 
State had in separating its brand of terrorism from its former parent group, Al Qaeda. 
Open-source reporting suggests the brand names of the two groups were interwoven as 
late as June 2014—that is, until the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, 
declared for the second time an Islamic Caliphate.80  
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The Islamic State has revolutionized how terrorist groups connect with 
stakeholders utilizing social media—mainly Twitter—to send messages and propaganda. 
The Islamic State publishes an estimated 90,000 Tweets per day and amassed roughly 
46,000 Twitter followers.81 This is an unprecedented achievement in jihadist propaganda. 
The group has managed to expand its brand in the cyber arena, reaching its target 
audience through one-to-one connections of its members with young Muslim men and 
women who support its cause via social media.82  
The Islamic State uses digital magazines, websites, and smartphone apps 
extensively. The group has websites associated with the smart-phone apps whereby the 
group sells clothing to Western recruits with cryptic Islamic State, and “jihad cool” 
phrases.83 This is a potential branding strategy for merging “terrorism chic” with “Islamic 
chic,” which appropriates Islamic symbols for fashion.84 The Islamic State’s deliberate 
and strategic use of creative and even mainstream marketing techniques suggests that the 
organization pays close attention to its brand and strategizes about expanding it into the 
international market. 
The one key difference between the Islamic State’s brand strategy and Al Qaeda’s 
is the capture of population centers, which adds to the size of the caliphate. The leader of 
Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, spoke often about a future Caliphate but stopped short of 
assuming his own authority to do so.85 Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi felt no 
such restraint. On June 29, 2014, he anointed himself the Caliph, declared all conquered 
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territory as the Islamic Caliphate, and re-branded the group the Islamic State.86 The 
Islamic State has been the first Islamic terrorist group to use overwhelming military force 
to seize land and capture major population centers. In the process, Islamic State fighters 
have embarrassed Iraqi and Syrian military forces, showing the world they are extremely 
capable of military conquest.87  
Defeating significant portions of the Iraqi and Syrian militaries so rapidly 
garnered enormous brand credibility and authenticity. The Islamic State backed up 
numerous promises made over the years that they would establish a caliphate. The 
Islamic State captured major cities in Syria, such as Raqqa and the ancient city of 
Palmyra, large oil fields, and major rural provinces. They defeated some security forces 
of the Assad regime. In 2013, the group conquered the western Iraqi city of Fallujah. In 
2014, the group captured the third largest city of Mosul, as well as Ramadi and Tikrit.88 
The Islamic State’s rapid seizures of population centers have positioned the groups as 
potential victors in the region. Osama bin Laden once stated, “When people see a strong 
horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse.”89 In 2014 and 2015, 
media coverage deemed the Islamic State’s brand as the potential winning horse in the 
fight against the Iraqi regime.  
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The Islamic State came within a few miles of Baghdad. This proximity threatened 
the capital, the center of gravity, and symbolic city of Iraq.90 Renowned military 
strategist Carl von Clausewitz developed the concept of a center of gravity defined as 
“the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point 
against which all our energies are directed.”91  Joseph Strange defines center of gravity as 
“the primary source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance.”92  The capital 
city is one center of gravity for a nation. Baghdad is considered the center of gravity for 
the Iraqi government. Losing the capital city to the Islamic State would logically precede 
the loss of the country. Despite the Islamic State’s successful and influential information 
campaigns, the most decisive brand strategy was its ability to conquer territory and 
follow through on its promise of a caliphate. No number of information campaigns could 
match the picture of the Islamic State flag raised over the capital of an Iraqi province and 
threatening Baghdad. This thesis hypothesizes that the Islamic State’s rapid and 
successful military conquests were the primary event that propelled the Islamic State into 
the realm of mass mediated terrorism.   
C. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, understanding the brands and brand exposure of terrorist groups 
may provide a different prism through which to analyze armed groups and offer insight 
into their identity, objectives, strategy, and vulnerabilities. Other broad frameworks to 
analyze terrorist groups may gloss over these aspects. Armed groups deliberately utilize 
brand elements to ensure the public understands their message. 
                                                 
90 For detailed maps of the Islamic State territorial gains, over time, visit the Institute for the Study of 
War’s “ISIS Sanctuary Map” http://www.understandingwar.org/project/isis-sanctuary-map : For further 
discussion of this problem, see Liz Sly, “How the Battle Against the Islamic State is Redrawing the Map of 
the Middle East,” Washington Post, December 30, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-the-
front-lines-of-the-war-against-the-islamic-state-a-tangled-web/2015/12/30/d944925a-9244-11e5-befa-
99ceebcbb272_story.html ; For a timeline of Islamic State major events, see The Wilson Center, Timeline: 
Rise and Spread of the Islamic State (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center,[2016]). 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state  
91 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,  On War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 596 
92 Joseph Strange, “Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building a Clausewitian Foundation 
so that we can all Speak the Same Language,” Perspectives on Warfighting 4, no. 2 (1996). 
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Symbolism is a critical element of terrorism. Analyzing the target as a symbol 
helps the recipient decode the terrorists’ message. Terrorist groups intend to influence 
political issues by leveling the playing field and striking symbolic targets. At a minimum, 
the acts communicate the terrorist group’s motivations, intentions, and resolve. They 
deliberately use symbolic targeting to manipulate media coverage. Gaining the attention 
of the media allows groups to spread their messages further and faster. Black 
September’s massacre of Israeli Olympians and Al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 were highly 
successful examples of symbolic targeting that garnered international attention through 
the media. The more attention a group gains, the more likely the group will receive 
support for its cause and future operations. By striking symbolic targets, terrorist groups 
increase the likelihood their brand exposure and material support will increase. 
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III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
A. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that terrorist groups can manipulate their brand 
exposure by conducting terrorist operations and, thus, strategically manage operations to 
keep their brand exposure high. This research seeks to answer three main hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Attacks by a given terrorist group will lead to an increase in that 
group’s brand exposure. 
Hypothesis 2: Attacks that achieve territorial gains near population centers will be 
associated with an increase in brand exposure. 
Hypothesis 3: Following the declaration of the caliphate, there will be less 
association between the Islamic State and the brand exposure of Al Qaeda. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Quantitative analysis of political science has been hampered by inefficient 
methods and overwhelming data that researchers have had to manually sort and code. The 
global propagation of the Internet has compounded the problem by increasing the 
quantity of data that has needed to be analyzed. Since the turn of the 21st century, 
statistical research in the political science field has made tremendous strides forward with 
automated coding through sophisticated data-collection methods. This automated 
technology capability to data-mines thousands of news sources on the Internet.. 
Researchers now have the ability to extract large volumes of data with algorithms that 
scour the Internet for search terms. Complex algorithms analyze text to categorize data 
sources, such as digital newspaper articles, by scanning for key-word combinations 
including names, locations, and specific action verbs such as “killed” or “detonated.” The 
automated systems provide researchers a greater capacity to mathematically explain 
social phenomena.93   
                                                 
93 Justin Grimmer and Brandon M. Stewart, “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic 
Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts,” Political Analysis 21, no. 3 (July 01, 2013): 267–297. 
doi:10.1093/pan/mps028. 
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Currently, the largest event data-collection projects are the Global Database of 
Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) and Lockheed Martin’s Integrated Crisis Early 
Warning System (ICEWS), a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–funded 
project.94 The GDELT project tracks the world’s broadcast, print, and web news and 
identifies people, locations, and organizations, aggregate counts of data, news sources, 
and emotions. This database has provided researchers a new method for logging and 
coding individual conflict events sorted by specific groups. GDELT’s translational 
platform provides the most extensive real-time news machine to translate over 65 
languages. GDELT has coded news data using the Conflict and Mediation Events 
Observations (CAMEO) taxonomy, a proven categorization of more than 300 event 
types.95  
One of GDELT’s sub-databases, the Global Knowledge Graph (GKG), uses a 
highly sophisticated algorithm to query news sources and extract a contextual description 
of conflicts. The theory behind the GKG is to provide a near–real time understanding of 
the global conversation.96 The database specifically counts how many times states, 
organizations, or people are mentioned over a given period. The GKG accounts for the 
number of times a terrorist organization is mentioned over a specific time, thus providing 
a measure of the dependent variable, brand exposure. Data from the GKG is only 
available for dates after April 1, 2013. The period for this research spans April 1, 2013 to 
December 31, 2015, which represents 1,000 days of observations. The ICEWS performs 
similar analysis; however, it cannot measure brand exposure at this time. ICEWS is 
                                                 
94 Michael D. Ward et al., “Comparing GDELT and ICEWS Event Data,” Analysis 21 (2013): 267–
297. 
95 www.gdeltproject.org . For  a copy of the CAMEO code book, see: Philip A. Schrodt and Omur 
Yilmaz, CAMEO: Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Codebook (Lawrence, KA: Center for 
International Political Analysis: Institute for Policy and Social Research: University of Kansas, 2007). To 
see a discussion on the history or conflict databases and coding for big data queries, see  Philip A. Schrodt 
and David Van Brackle, “Automated Coding of Political Event Data,” in Handbook of Computational 
Approaches to Counterterrorism, ed. V. S. Subrahmanian (New York: Springer Science CBusiness Media, 
2013): 23–49. Haewoon Kwak and Jisun An, “A First Look at Global News Coverage of Disasters by using 
the GDELT Dataset.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial 
Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). 8851 (2014): 300–308.  
96 Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT).  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG), 
Accessed January 4, 2016, http://gdeltproject.org/. 
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designed specifically to search for and record conflict events. It focuses on logging 
conflict events and applies a “de-duplication” process that stops short of tracking how 
many times the media mentions a specific event or the actors involved.97  
To sort by brand name, this thesis filtered the GKG database for all coded terrorist 
organizations, which resulted in roughly 2,400 returned results across the globe for all 
terrorist groups. The results included many name variations for the same group, which 
were manually combined and summed to provide a cumulative brand exposure over the 
1,000-day period. The top five highest returns for brand exposure in order from greatest 
to least were as follows: the Islamic State, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and 
Hamas (see Figure 2). This thesis is specifically focused on analyzing Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State because the Islamic State is a former franchise of Al Qaeda’s, and the 
groups are currently in direct competition.  
1. Dependent Variable 
The unit of measure for the dependent variable, brand exposure, is one article that 
mentions the brand name of a terrorist group in a 24-hour time span. The total number of 
articles in one day is then divided by the total number of news articles across all subjects 
in the same 24-hour period, thereby making brand exposure a percentage of the global 
news market-share. The percentage is important because the denominator is always the 
function of the day’s total news articles and, therefore, accounts for variations in the data. 
The primary dependent variable in this research is the level of the terrorist group’s brand 
exposure each day.  
 
                                                 
97 Ward et al., Comparing GDELT and ICEWS Event Data, 267–297 
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Figure 2.  The Brand Exposure of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
 
This figure is of the top five groups the brand exposure with the highest brand exposure and provides a relative comparison of Al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State. The dramatic rise in the Islamic State may be lost without the relative comparison to other groups of the 
same caliber of attention.98 
                                                 
98 This figure was created using the  Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG). 
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The naming conventions for some groups posed a challenge because the media confused 
who perpetrated the events. Al Qaeda has franchised several groups over the course of the last 
two decades and often times those groups use Al Qaeda’s name within theirs. For example, the 
Islamic State, a different group now, was a franchise of Al Qaeda with a brand name “Al Qaeda 
in Iraq.” This poses a challenge for the dependent variable accounting for a change in name, or 
attributing the source of an event to one brand name when in reality it was another. The brand 
name of a group is the primary differentiator within the GKG database. However, for the 
purposes of the dependent variable, differentiating between the specific group, Al Qaeda or the 
Islamic State, was irrelevant. In this case, if the Islamic State was the real source of the event, but 
the media attributed the event to Al Qaeda, then Al Qaeda essentially benefits from the media’s 
ignorance. The failure falls on the Islamic State for to differentiate the brand from Al Qaeda. For 
independent variables, the attribution is not a problem. In places human coders inaccurately 
labeled the source of an event as Al Qaeda in Iraq due to a slow transition in coding names, when 
the group in question is in reality the Islamic State, the actual name of the group was manually 
corrected in the database. 
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variable of terrorist attacks was measured using the Political Instability 
Task Force (PITF)’s Worldwide Atrocities Dataset. This dataset is funded by the Central 
Intelligence Agency and, according to their website, “is a global dataset that describes, in 
quantitative terms, the deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians in the context of a wider 
political conflict.”99 Its methodology uses news sources collected from the Internet combined 
with manipulation by conventional human coders. PITF aligns with this thesis in that the 
dependent variable is automated by an algorithm and not independently verified by a human 
coder but the independent variable of attacks and death counts are coded by humans. According 
to the PITF codebook, the dataset measures “the deliberate use of lethal violence against non-
combatant civilians by actors engaged in a wider political or military conflict.”100 The effective 
                                                 
99 Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities Dataset,” Accessed March 3, 2016, 
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/atrocities.html 
 
100 Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities Dataset,” Accessed March 3, 2016, 
32 
dates of this dataset span January 1, 1995 through December 31, 2015. This was the only dataset 
available through the end of 2015, which at the time, provided the only means to measure 
attacks. The dataset has a limitation in that events in Syria are not recorded due to the 
complicated task of accurately attributing the source of attack to the correct group. Although this 
was a severe limitation in terms of individual attacks, other methods for counting hostages and 
land advances within Syria were available, as discussed in the following subsections. When the 
PITF data was filtered against the timeframe of the GDELT’s GKG, there were roughly 3,750 
observations across the globe. The number of attacks attributed to the chosen terrorist group 
sample totaled roughly 300 events.  
The database on Islamic State land advances was manually created using open source 
material to collect the date of the land advance, the city name, and country. The Islamic State is 
the only terrorist group who continually gains territory for the purposes of occupation. It has 
overrun government facilities, military bases, large cities such as Mosul, Iraq, and threatened the 
capital cities of Baghdad and Damascus. The population of the city prior to the capture does not 
factor into the calculations during this research.  
This research also attributes lone wolf terrorist attacks to the group whom the attacker 
swore allegiance. This is because the tactics of terrorists have changed and often call on Muslims 
to strike out against Western nations. Therefore, groups essentially benefit from the media 
exposure of lone wolf attacks, which cost the group nothing to generate. An increase in brand 
exposure as the result of a lone wolf attack would validate this strategy.   
3. Control Variables 
During the course of the research, the graphical depictions of the PITF data presented a 
gap in accounting for potential factors that influence brand exposure. Because the PITF codes for 
terrorist attacks during which a minimum of five civilians are killed, the kidnapping, release, or 
execution of individual hostages is excluded. To fix this gap, we employed the database of 
Western hostages from 2001 to 2015 created by the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) at West 
Point.101 Using the United Nations definition, the analysts define a hostage as “a person detained 
                                                 
101 Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time 
and Jihadist Organizations., accessed March 10, 2016, https://s3.amazonaws.com/com-ter-cen/hostages/index.html. 
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and under the threat of death, injury, or continued detention by an individual or group in order to 
compel a third party to do (or abstain from doing) any act as an explicit or implicit condition of 
the person’s release.”102 The data is limited to Westerners because the collection method uses 
open source data, which are extremely limited and often non-existent for non-Western citizens 
who are kidnapped inside their own countries by terrorist groups. For example, the lack of media 
access to denied areas in Iraq and Syria make accurate and comprehensive accounts of native 
Syrian and Iraqi citizens virtually impossible. There are some accounts, but it is impossible to 
know for certain that news coverage includes every host-national kidnapped. These events 
happen so often and occur simultaneously with other larger attacks; therefore, they often fail to 
meet the threshold for reporting by local and international media sources.  
The CTC hostage data include Westerners kidnapped and held inside Syria.103 The 
critical information for the CTC hostage database includes the nationality of the victims, the 
country where they were kidnapped, the group that kidnapped them, and the result of their 
kidnapping. Western hostages account for 275 hostage operations conducted by jihadist 
organizations over the 1,000-day period in this research. Examples of the results of a kidnapping 
include execution, release, death in captivity, or death during the rescue attempt.  
To define and measure the differences between autocratic and democratic countries, the 
Polity V dataset, which is maintained by the Center for Systemic Peace, was accessed. The Polity 
Project tracks the transitions from autocratic to democratic regimes across the globe. The Polity 
Project is highly respected and widely used for coding and the authority characteristics of nation 
states in quantitative research. The polity scores are on a 21-point scale, from -10 for autocracies 
and +10 for democracies.104 This data provided the ability to filter countries, by democracy or 
autocracy, where terrorist attacks were conducted by the Islamic State or Al Qaeda. This research 
used democracies with scores greater than 6.   
  
                                                 
102 Seth Loertscher and Daniel Milton, “Held Hostage: Analysis of Kidnappings Across Time and among 
Jihadist Organizations” (New York: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The United States Military 
Academy, 2015). 
103 Ibid. 
104 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers, Polity™ IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012 -Dataset Users’ Manual (Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace, 2013). 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The concept of terrorist brand exposure suggests that terrorist groups may execute actions 
that cause an increase or decrease in their brand exposure. Because terrorist groups use violence 
to communicate, the analysis for three hypotheses tests the effectiveness of violence on the brand 
exposure of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. This chapter provides justification and methods used 
in the binomial regression models, followed by a discussion of the results.  
The Islamic State conducted a higher number of events that happened relatively close 
together. The Islamic State conducted terrorist attacks and militarily seized population centers 
before and after which many events happened in rapid succession. The data suggest that when 
large-scale terrorist attacks occur against population centers, the city is captured, and then the 
group consolidates control over the population. When the Islamic State has consolidated control, 
it has often executed civilian hostages, journalists, and government officials. To analyze the 
capture of population centers by the Islamic State, the regressions controlled for other actions 
that would increase the group’s brand exposure.  
The binomial regressions controlled for attacks and various hostage operations conducted 
by the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and all other groups. There were 64 Al Qaeda events and 228 
Islamic State events between April 1, 2013 and December 31, 2015. In both regression models, a 
two-day lag controlled for the possibility that the same variable had occurred within the previous 
two days.105 The models were intended to be predictive based on events that occurred in the past. 
Therefore, the variable is represented as “Today,” and the lagged variable is represented as the 
“Last two days” (see Tables 1 and 2). Both models represent the predictive value, so the output 
would read as follows:  
“If this variable occurred today, controlling for the previous 2 days, then… .” 
Figures 3 and 4 provide a visualization of key statements relevant to the results and all 
independent variables conducted by the groups. These figures provide visualizations of the 
independent variables over time with the corresponding level of brand exposure.  
                                                 
105 Other lags included 3,4,7, and 14 day lags. In all cases, the AIC was lowest, and therefore the most 
predictive with the 2 day lag.  
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The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. In Table 1, the 
dependent variable is the brand exposure of the Islamic State while in Table 2, the dependent 
variable is the brand exposure of Al Qaeda. The model created for the Islamic State, as presented 
in Table 1—which differs from Al Qaeda’s model presented in Table 2—was able to distinguish 
between greater types of events because the Islamic State had a greater frequency and diversity 
of attacks. The Islamic State regression in Table 1 tested for the group’s capture of population 
centers, attacks in democratic countries, and hostage operations. The model controlled for 
Islamic State actions, its attacks with death tolls of greater than 100 and 400, as well as hostage 
operations and terrorist events by all terrorist groups.  
Al Qaeda’s model in Table 2 controlled for fewer events as the group conducted 64 
attacks of less diversity than the Islamic State. Figure 4 provides a visualization of the key events 
between April 1, 2013, and December 31, 2015. The model tested for Al Qaeda’s attacks in 
democracies, its hostage operations, and all terrorism-related events. Unlike the Islamic State 
whose numbers often exceeded 100, Al Qaeda conducted zero attacks that killed more than 100 
people. The model controlled for the following variables:  hostages operations, all hostage 
events, and all terrorist events.  
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Table 1.   Islamic State’s Brand Exposure 
Dependent variable: 
Islamic State’s Brand Exposure
Islamic State Capture of Population Center (Today) 0.029*** (0.007) 
Islamic State Capture of Population Center (Last 2 days) 0.125*** (0.005) 
Islamic State Attack on Democracy (Today) 0.150*** (0.005) 
Islamic State Attack on Democracy (Last 2 days) 0.164*** (0.004) 
Islamic State Hostage Event (Today) -0.328*** (0.008) 
Islamic State Hostage Event (Last 2 days) -0.518*** (0.006) 
Islamic State Attack That Kills >100 (Today) 0.124*** (0.008) 
Islamic State Attack That Kills >100 (Last 2 days) 0.219*** (0.006) 
Islamic State Attack That Kills >400 (Today) -0.510*** (0.047) 
Islamic State Attack That Kills >400 (Last 2 days) -0.204*** (0.029) 
Terrorist Attack on Democracy by Any Group (Today) -0.087*** (0.002) 
Terrorist Attack on Democracy by Any Group (Last 2 days) -0.025*** (0.002) 
All Hostage Events by Any Group (Today) 0.053*** (0.004) 
All Hostage Events by Any Group (Last 2 days) -0.102*** (0.003) 
All Terrorist Events (Today) 0.040*** (0.002) 
All Terrorist Events (Last 2 days) -0.061*** (0.003) 
Islamic State’s Brand Exposure (Last 2 days) 25.524*** (0.020) 
Constant -4.411*** (0.003) 
Observations 1,003 
Log Likelihood -277,447.100 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 554,930.200 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01
The author created Table 1 using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide 
Atrocities Dataset”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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Table 2.   Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure 
Dependent variable: 
Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure
Al Qaeda Attack on Democracy (Today) 0.493*** (0.020) 
Al Qaeda Attack on Democracy (Last 2 days) -1.572*** (0.018) 
Al Qaeda Hostage Event (Today) 0.141*** (0.018) 
Al Qaeda Hostage Event (Last 2 days) 0.259*** (0.014) 
Terrorist Attack on Democracy by Any Group (Today) -0.112*** (0.006) 
Terrorist Attack on Democracy by Any Group (Last 2 days) -0.013*** (0.005) 
All Hostage Events by Any Group (Today) 0.092*** (0.010) 
All Hostage Events by Any Group (Last 2 days) -0.093*** (0.008) 
All Terrorist Events (Today) -0.059*** (0.005) 
All Terrorist Events (Last 2 days) -0.049*** (0.009) 
Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure (Last 2 days) 129.024*** (0.302) 
Constant -6.096*** (0.008) 
Observations 1,003 
Log Likelihood -39,946.080 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 79,916.160 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01
The author created Table 2 using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide 
Atrocities Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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Figure 3.  The Islamic State’s Brand Exposure 
 
The Islamic State Brand Exposure with key statements relevant to the results and all independent variables.106
                                                 
106 The author created this figure using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph 
(GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.  
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Figure 4.  Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure 
 
Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure with key statements and all independent variables.107 
                                                 
107 The author created this figure using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph 
(GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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Hypothesis 1: Attacks by a given terrorist group lead to an increase in that group’s brand 
exposure. 
There are significant (p < 0.01) positive coefficients for different types of terrorist attacks 
by both groups. The data suggests that the Islamic State and Al Qaeda can increase their brand 
exposure by comitting violence, which rejects the null hypothesis and allows us to accept 
hypothesis 1. Attacks in democractic countries produced a significant (p < 0.01) positive 
coefficient, suggesting that attacking these countries generates an increase in brand exposure (see 
Figures 5 and 6). For Al Qaeda, the result indicates not only that attacks in democratic countries 
generate increases in brand exposure but also that they generate a greater increase in brand 
expose than other types of attacks. Perhaps this provides one explanation for Al Qaeda’s loss of 
brand dominance to the Islamic State: the group’s low frequency of attacks on democratic 
countries.  
Terrorists groups have changed strategies away from training terrorists in remote 
locations, infiltrating them abroad, and then procuring material means for an attack. Now, jihadi 
terrorist groups call on Muslims around the world to procure materials locally, choose targets, 
and conduct lone-wolf attacks within their host countries. This lone-wolf strategy appears to 
work so long as the perpetrator claims affiliation with the group, and the attack occurs in a 
democratic country. Whether the attack itself succeeds or fails is irrelevant to the group. The 
current strategy expends little resources to motivate individuals, and the return on investment 
appears to be exponentially greater than the old strategy. A few examples of lone-wolf attacks 
include the attack at Fort Hood, Texas, that killed 13 U.S. Soldiers; the attack on the Muhammad 
drawing-competition in Dallas, Texas, which resulted in the death of only the perpetrator; and 
the attack in San Bernardino, California, that killed 14 civilians.  
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Figure 5.  The Proportion of the Islamic State Brand Exposure When Attacks Occur 
 
The lines show the expected levels of brand exposure, given the presence or absence of an attack 
in a given country, with all other variables held constant at their means. The gray bands show 95% 
confidence intervals for the expected values.108 
  
                                                 
108 The author created this figure using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities 
Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. Combating Terrorism 
Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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Figure 6.  The Proportional of Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure When Attacks Occur  
 
The lines show the expected levels of brand exposure, given the presence or absence of an attack 
in a given country, with all other variables held constant at their means. The gray bands show 95% 
confidence intervals for the expected values109 
 
                                                 
109 The author created this figure using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task Force. “Worldwide Atrocities 
Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist Organizations. Combating Terrorism 
Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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Counter-intuitively, both groups’ hostage operations produced significant (p < 
0.01) negative coefficients, suggesting that those operations do not generate an increase 
in brand exposure (see Figures 5 and 6). Unsurprisingly, Islamic State attacks of which 
the death toll was greater than 100 generated an increased brand exposure as there was a 
significant (p < 0.01) positive coeficient (see Figure 5). Terrorist attacks of which the 
death toll was greater than 100 were also a high predictor of brand exposure. This 
explains why the Islamic State’s Paris attacks in November 2015 generated almost 18 
percent of all new coverage. The attacks killed 137 civilians in one of the most 
recognizable democratic capitals in the world. This was not the first terrorist attack in 
Europe, nor was it the highest death toll. This attack far exceeded the media coverage of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015. That attack killed 12, and many 
suspected the perpetrator was the Islamic State until Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
claimed responsibility six days later. However, counter-intuitevly, attacks of which the 
death toll was greater than 400 had a significant (p < 0.01) negative coeficient, suggesting 
a decrease in brand exposure. (see Figure 5). 
Hypothesis 2: Attacks that achieve territorial gains near population centers 
correspond with an increase in brand exposure. 
There is a significant (p < 0.01) positive coefficient that correlates the capture of a 
population center by the Islamic State to an increase in its brand exposure, rejecting the 
null hypothesis and allowing us to accept Hypothesis 2.110 The Islamic State has 
differentiated itself from all other groups by declaring a caliphate, backing up its 
promises, and conquering territory by defeating the military forces of Syria and Iraq. The 
Islamic State’s rapid defeat of both military forces and, then, its advance close to the 
capital city of Baghdad seem to have played a significant role in reaching the pinnacle of 
mass-mediated terrorism and differentiating its brand from all other terrorist groups.  
Hypothesis 3: Following Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate, there is less of 
an association between the brand exposures of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. 
                                                 
110 As a robustness check, lags for 3, 7, and 14 days indicate similar results. In each case the level of 
predictive success was higher for the 2-day lag.  
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Al Qaeda appears to have unique trends in that its brand name is often associated 
with other groups. Due to the group’s positioning strategy as the umbrella—or self-
proclaimed base—of Islamic terrorism since the early 1990s, it has franchised different 
affiliates across the globe. Therefore, when the news media references a franchise, there 
is a high likelihood Al Qaeda is also mentioned. For example, Abu Sayyaf in the 
Southern Philippine Islands was an Al Qaeda affiliate from the early 1990s until 2014, so 
the odds are high that Al Qaeda is mentioned in news articles discussing Abu Sayyaf.111 
The Islamic State was once called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Though the name of 
the brand changed from AQI to the Islamic State of Iraq sometime around 2009, the data 
suggests the news media did not make that transition smoothly. As shown in Figures 3 
and 4, Al Qaeda’s brand exposure had increased along with the Islamic State’s brand 
exposure until Al Qaeda formally announced it had severed the relationship on February 
3, 2014. A simple Google news search for the first week of January 2014 reveals 
confusion in the media as to whether Al Qaeda or the Islamic State captured the Syrian 
city of Raqqa. After February 3, 2014, the trend decreases slightly, but Al Qaeda’s brand 
exposure continued to increase along with the Islamic State’s. This is likely because the 
earlier brand names of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) were not particularly well known outside of foreign policy or terrorism 
experts. This is an indication that the Islamic State had not properly differentiated its 
brand from Al Qaeda’s. This closeness of the two brand exposures appears significantly 
lower after the Islamic State captured Mosul, the leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi 
proclaimed a caliphate, and the group rebranded itself simply the Islamic State. The 
linkage between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda seems to decrease significantly. 
Unfortunately for the Islamic State, it appears that the two groups may always be 
associated to a lesser degree. The trend suggests that even though the groups are current 
rivals, the media’s discussion of one group seems to trigger a discussion of the other.  
                                                 
111 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University 
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46 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3. For all models in Table 3, 
the dependent variable is the brand exposure of the Islamic State. To test hypothesis 3, 
model one analyzed the closeness of the brand exposures of the Islamic State and Al 
Qaeda before the declaration of the caliphate, between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 
2014. Model two analyzed the closeness after the declaration of the caliphate between 
June 30, 2014 and December 31, 2015. As an additional test, model three analyzed the 
closeness between January 1, 2015 and June 30, 2015. The models controlled for attacks 
by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, their brand exposure, as well as attacks by all terrorist 
groups.    
Figure 7 is the graphical depiction of the closeness in the relationship between the 
Islamic State’s and Al Qaeda’s brand names over the three periods. With each increase in 
Al Qaeda’s brand exposure there is a subsequent increase in the Islamic State’s brand 
exposure. The slope of the lines represents the degree of closeness between the brand 
names. The greater the slopes of the line, the closer the association of the brand names. 
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Table 3.   Islamic State Brand Name Connection to the Al Qaeda Brand Name 








(1) (2) (3) 
Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure 197.927*** 39.891*** 11.426*** 
(7.415) (2.201) (0.431) 
Islamic State Attack 0.158*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.004) 
Islamic State Attack (Last 2 
days) -0.018 -0.226
*** -0.059*** 
(0.014) (0.005) (0.003) 
All Events 0.156*** -0.101*** 0.011*** 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.003) 
All Events (Last 2 days) -0.136** 0.233*** -0.032*** 
(0.055) (0.012) (0.006) 
Al Qaeda’s Brand Exposure 
(Last 2 days) -96.613
*** -8.915*** -11.197*** 
(9.043) (2.626) (0.484) 
Islamic State’s Brand Exposure 
(Last 2 days) 75.474
*** 35.106*** 23.762*** 
(0.428) (0.073) (0.067) 
Constant -6.215*** -5.043*** -4.181*** 
(0.053) (0.012) (0.006) 
Observations 180 184 181 
Log Likelihood -5,246.923 -22,513.800 -11,949.560 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,509.850 45,043.610 23,915.110 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01
The author created Table 3 using the following data sources: Global Database of Events, 
Language, and Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task 
Force. “Worldwide Atrocities Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time 
and Jihadist Organizations. Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.  
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Figure 7.  Islamic State Brand Name Connection to the Al Qaeda Brand Name 
 
The lines show the expected levels of brand exposure, given the presence or absence of 
attacks by either group, with all other variables held constant at their means. The gray 
bands show 95% confidence intervals for the expected values.112 
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Language, and Tone (GDELT),  Global Knowledge Graph (GKG): Political Instability Task Force. 
“Worldwide Atrocities Dataset.”: Held Hostage: Analyses of Kidnapping Across Time and Jihadist 
Organizations. Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. 
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The results suggest that the Islamic State has sometimes struggled to differentiate 
its brand from its former Al-Qaeda headquarters. Period 1, prior to Al Qaeda officially 
severing ties shows a greater, statistically significant (p < 0.01), positive coefficient. The 
substantial increase in Al Qaeda’s brand exposure coefficient in model 3—following the 
announcement of the Islamic State severing ties with Al Qaeda—suggests that though the 
media failed to differentiate between the two groups prior to this split, the distinction 
between the two groups sparked conversation. Essentially, by announcing the split, Al 
Qaeda bonded the two brand names. For the Islamic State brand, this is a continuation of 
the differentiation problem. Although Al Qaeda had little to no contributions, it continued 
to maintain dominance between the two brand names and benefitted from the success of 
the Islamic State’s operations. The significant (p < 0.01) positive coefficient in model 3 
shows a dramatic rise compared to the two previous models, suggesting the problem of 
differentiating the two brand names became worse, not better, after the split.  
The Islamic State seemed to make a deliberate effort to separate its brand from Al 
Qaeda’s once and for all on June 29, 2014. During a rare public appearance in the 
recently conquered city of Mosul, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi declared an Islamic caliphate. 
Figure 3 appears to show a dramatic uptick in attacks by the Islamic State after the 
declaration of the caliphate. The declaration as well as the increase in the frequency and 
severity of attacks appears to have alleviated the problem for the Islamic State, as the 
significant (p < 0.01) positive coefficients decrease over time in relation to the previous 
models. This result suggests that the closeness of the two brand names decreases over the 
latter two periods. The results suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept 
Hypothesis 3. The deliberate move to declare the caliphate successfully differentiated the 
brand name of the Islamic State from Al Qaeda.  
In conclusion, the results of this thesis validate the concept that terrorist groups 
can manage their brands by the types of terrorist strategies they choose. Terrorist groups 
that want to increase awareness among the international media must conduct attacks in 
democratic countries to generate the greatest increase in brand exposure. The Islamic 
State was a franchise of Al Qaeda’s, and as a result, the two groups’ brand names are 
forever linked. When the Islamic State differentiated itself as a group, it struggled to 
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separate its brand from Al Qaeda’s and was hampered in the level of international support 
it could generate. The Islamic State had to change strategies. By conquering large 
population centers and declaring a caliphate, the group eventually increased its brand 
exposure enough to differentiate its brand name from Al Qaeda’s.   
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V. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Areas for future research of brand exposure are unlimited. There are many 
terrorist groups and many types of symbolic terrorism that have not been covered in this 
thesis. Opportunities to test variables based on symbolic differentiation include areas 
such as cultural terrorism and terrorism against people with Western versus non-Western 
citizenship. All are interesting research projects to test the bounds of terrorist brand 
exposure and to measure the effectiveness of terrorist strategies.  
One interesting research question could ask whether an increase in a terrorist 
group’s brand exposure correlates with a subsequent increase in the rate of foreign 
fighters to the group. Currently, there is no comprehensive international database of 
foreign fighters available to the public. However, if a database were created in the future, 
this would be an interesting research project. This potential study might hypothesize that 
a dramatic increase in the average brand exposure of a terrorist group correlates with a 
subsequent increase in the flow of foreign fighters to the group.  
Another interesting study would be on the geographical visualization of a group’s 
brand exposure by news sources at the national level. The analysis could reveal which 
media sources in which countries provide coverage of each group’s attacks. If a group 
conducts an attack in North Africa, for example, this study might hypothesize there is a 
greater increase in brand exposure in North Africa and Europe than in the United States. 
Such a differentiation may signal the interest level of policy makers in certain terrorist 
groups based on geography and a nation’s history in that region.  
The brand exposure measurement may be the first step toward future quantitative 
analysis of a terrorist group’s brand awareness and, ultimately, its brand equity. Brand 
equity measurements, or the financial value of the brand itself, could assign a quantitative 
number to the strength of a brand in relation to other terrorist groups and governments. 
Such research may explain what makes some brands stronger than others, why terrorist 
groups franchise, or why some groups choose to become a franchise of another group.  
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There are many opportunities to analyze terrorist groups through the lens of brand 
theory. This research analyzed only one brand element, the brand name. Terrorist groups 
utilize other brand elements for the purposes of communicating a symbolic message to 
their stakeholders. Terrorist logos are an under-researched area. Terrorist logos are visual 
depictions of how groups see themselves and how they want to portray their motives to 
stakeholders. Weapons are a common element in terrorist brand logos. A research 
question may ask whether there is a correlation between the size of the weapon in 
proportion to the overall size of the logo and a group’s level of violence. Do groups with 
larger proportionally sized weapons in their logos behave more violently than groups 
with less proportionally sized weapons, or no weapons, in their logos? If there is a strong 
correlation, researchers could use the results of such a study to develop a predictive 
model of violent behavior for emerging terrorist groups, splinter groups, or re-branding 
efforts of existing groups.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
market their brands in an effort to generate support in terms of funding and recruits, both 
of which ultimately increase their capacity to conduct operations. To increase the brand 
awareness, terrorist groups conduct violent symbolic actions to generate attention within 
the media. The expected increase in awareness depends on the type of action. 
The findings suggest terrorist brand exposure is a valid measurement to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a terrorist group’s strategic brand management. Brand exposure can 
measure the effectiveness of violent attacks, franchising, and differentiation of brand 
names among competing terrorist groups. The results validate the theory that terrorist 
groups can influence their brand exposure through violent terrorist actions. Terrorist 
groups can develop proper brand strategies that differentiate themselves in the 
competition for resources.  
The findings suggest that focusing on credibility and authenticity by keeping 
promises and staying true to a cause is critical to a terrorist group’s success. The Islamic 
State struggled to differentiate itself from Al Qaeda, but the group stayed true to the core 
tenets of establishing an Islamic caliphate, and kept its promise by capturing large 
population centers to increase the caliphate’s territory. Its rapid defeat of Iraqi and Syrian 
forces brought additional credibility and reliability to the brand.  
Conventional military operations that captured population centers provided a 
critical boost to the Islamic State’s brand. The findings suggest the reverse is also likely 
to be true. Militarily reversing the Islamic State’s territorial gains will shrink the overall 
size of the caliphate and force the group to break its promises of maintaining the 
caliphate. Losing territory will damage the Islamic State’s brand credibility and remove 
the winning horse phenomena. 
 Communications strategies to counter the Islamic State are unlikely to overcome 
its brand strength without also re-capturing territory. Policy makers should consider a 
54 
combined arms strategy of militarily defeating the Islamic State while communicating the 
group’s inability to prevent their losses and keep their promises.  
The results were conclusive that Islamic State hostage operations do not provide 
the expected return on investment because those operations correlate to a decrease in the 
groups brand exposure. The decrease in brand exposure may explain why the group has 
shifted away from this strategy.  
Conversely, attacks in democratic countries are the highest predictive factor in 
generating an increase in brand exposure. Therefore, policy makers may choose to focus 
greater resources and efforts to defend democracies from terrorist attacks and prevent 
such groups from gaining valuable global attention—thus decreases their material support 
for future operations. Such efforts in democratic countries, combined with efforts to build 
partner nations’ capacities to prevent the loss of population centers, may be the best 
strategy to degrade a terrorist group’s ability to build strong and credible brands. 
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